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Abstract
This paper tests a learning-based model of strategic teaching in repeated games
with incomplete information. The repeated game has a long-run player whose type
is unknown to a group of short-run players. The proposed model assumes a fraction
of ‘short-run’ players follow a one-parameter learning model (self-tuning EWA). In
addition, some ‘long-run’ players are myopic while others are sophisticated and ra-
tionally anticipate how short-run players adjust their actions over time and “teach”
the short-run players to maximize their long-run payoﬀs. All players optimize nois-
ily. The proposed model nests an agent-based quantal-response equilibrium (AQRE)
and the standard equilibrium models as special cases. Using data from 28 experi-
mental sessions of trust and entry repeated games, including 8 previously unpub-
lished sessions, the model ﬁts substantially better than chance and much better than
standard equilibrium models. Estimates show that most of the long-run players are
sophisticated, and short-run players become more sophisticated with experience.
Key words: repeated games, self-tuning experience-weighted attraction learning,
quantal response equilibrium
1 This research was supported by NSF grant SES-0078911. Thanks to John Kagel
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Many transactions in the economy are conducted repeatedly by players who ei-
ther know the history of behavior by others and anticipate future interactions.
Examples include cartels, employment relations, merchant banking relation-
ships, long-standing corporate rivalries, customers who are loyal to retailers,
lending to customers with known credit histories, and so forth. Game theo-
rists model these situations as repeated games with incomplete information
and study their sequential equilibria (SE).
Two early experimental studies evaluated the accuracy of SEpredictions in
repeated trust games (Camerer and Weigelt (1988a)) and entry deterrence
games (Jung, Kagel, and Levin (1994)). In these games, a long-run player is
matched repeatedly with a group of short-run players. The long-run player
can be one of the two types (normal or special). The short-run players know
the proportions of the two types, but do not know which type of the long-run
player they face.
In the trust game, a single borrower B (i.e., the long-run player) wants to
borrow money from a series of 8 lenders denoted Li (i =1 ,...,8) (i.e., the
short-run players) (cf. Kreps (1990)). A lender makes only a single lending
decision (either Loan or No Loan). The borrower makes a string of decisions,
(either Repay or Default), each time a lender chooses Loan.
The entry game deterrence is similar. A series of eight short-run entrants each
decide, one at a time, whether to enter or stay out in a series of periods. If
the entrant enters in a period, a long-run incumbent decides whether to ﬁght
or share.
The payoﬀs in the trust game imply that if the games were only one stage, the
borrower would Default; anticipating this, the rational lender would choose No
Loan. Similarly, in a one-stage entry deterrence game the entrant would enter
because she would anticipate that the incumbent would share. The special
types of borrowers and incumbents have payoﬀs which create a preference for
repaying or ﬁghting, respectively, rather than defaulting or sharing.
Both experimental studies showed three empirical regularities:
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2(1) The basic patterns predicted by SEoccur in the data: In the trust game,
borrowers are more likely to default in later rounds than in earlier rounds,
and lending rates fall after a previous default. Similarly, incumbents are
more likelyto share in later rounds, and entry rates increase after sharing.
(2) There are two systematic deviations from the SEpredictions: (a) There
are too few defaults (by borrowers) and too few ﬁghts (by incumbents);
and (b) the predicted rates of lending and entering increasing smoothly
across rounds, while the SEpredicts a step function across periods.
(3) In the experiments, subjects played 50-100 eight period sequences. Equi-
libration occurred across sequences (”cross-sequence learning”) and be-
tween experimental sessions (experienced subjects were closer to SEthan
inexperienced subjects).
Camerer and Weigelt (1988a) and Jung et al. (1994) showed that the SE
prediction could be modiﬁed to explain both the basic patterns (1) and the
deviation (2a) above by assuming that some proportion of normal-type players
acted like the special types induced by the experimenter (the “home-made
prior”).
These early analyses fell short in three ways: First, the prior was inferred from
the data rather than measured separately in one-stage games. Second, the SE
predictions of trust and entry rely on two diﬀerent special types of opposite
behavioral kinds– one is trustworthy (sacriﬁcing money to help others) and the
other is vindictive (sacriﬁcing money to harm others). Third, the modiﬁed SE
model with a homemade prior cannot explain deviation (2b) and the cross-
sequence learning (3). Authors of both studies recognize that the modiﬁed
SEmodel cannot explain cross-sequence learning. As (Camerer and Weigelt,
1988a, p. 27-28) note 2 :
“...the long period of disequilibrium behavior early in these experiments
raises the important question of how people learn to playcomplicatedgames.
The data could be ﬁt to statistical learning models (e.g., Selten and Stoecker
(1986)), though new experiments or new models might be needed to explain
learning adequately.”
Responding to Camerer and Weigelt’s call for new learning models, this paper
develops and estimates a learning-based model with strategic ”teaching”. In
the model, a fraction of short-run players learn adaptively from experience
and the rest are ”sophisticated” 3 – they rationally anticipate how the long-
2 And see (Jung et al., 1994, p. 90)
3 See Selten (1991), Milgrom and Roberts (1991), and Fudenberg and Kreps (1990)
for models of sophistication. Adding sophistication to adaptive learning makes sense
because long-run player subjects often have a sense that short-run players are learn-
ing. Models with sophistication also predict that players care about the payoﬀs of
others, and how they are matched with partners in the future (adaptive learning
3run players learn and behave. Similarly, a fraction of long-run players are
sophisticated and the rest are myopic (they act as if they are playing a one-
stage game). In repeated games with partner matching, sophisticated long-run
players have an incentive to “teach” the short-run learners what to expect.
This kind of “strategic teaching” has been proposed as a boundedly rational
theory of reputation formation (see Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Watson
(1993) and Watson and Battigali (1997)). Camerer et al. (2002) oﬀer the ﬁrst
empirical implementation of such a model using data from repeated trust
games. 4
This general model both extends simple adaptive learning models, by adding
sophistication, and weakens equilibrium models, by adding learning. Because
the model mixes adaptive and sophisticated types, certain parameter restric-
tions reduce the model to boundary cases of special interest. Purely adaptive
learning is one boundary case. When all players are sophisticated, believe all
others are sophisticated, and best-respond, the model reduces to simply an-
other boundary case – Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We study an Agent Quan-
tal Response Equilibrium (AQRE) version of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. In
AQRE, players optimize noisily but update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule and
anticipate accurately what others will do (McKelvey and Palfrey (1998)).
Adding adaptive players make sense because there are behavioral diﬀerences
between sophisticated and adaptive players. Consider the lender in the trust
games. Adaptive lenders will continue lending until a default occurs, after
which later lenders are less likely to lend. A sophisticated lender, in contrast,
anticipates default by assessing the probability of the borrower being a normal
(“dishonest”) type. Hence she will stop lending when the posterior probability
of dishonest type is high enough that the expected payoﬀ from lending exceeds
not lending. This could happen even without a default in previous rounds. In
short, adaptive players react to past default behavior but sophisticated players
anticipate future default behavior.
The general model has the potential to improve the modiﬁed SEused in earlier
papers, which fell short in three ways:
models don’t have these properties), consistent with experimental evidence (Partow
and Schotter (1993), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994), Cachon and Camerer (1996),
Andreoni and Miller (1993)). Models including sophistication have generally ﬁt bet-
ter in matrix games, signaling games, repeated trust games, and p-beauty contest
games (see Stahl (1999), Cooper and Kagel (2001), Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2002),
Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998)).
4 Their model consists solely of adaptive short run players who follow a parametric
EWA model (which requires a total of 18 parameters). They do not allow their long
run players to be a special home-made type. However, the special home-made type
is estimated in the benchmark AQRE model. The models are validated on one trust
game dataset from Camerer and Weigelt (1988a).
4First, the value of the home-made prior is measured separately, in one-stage
experiments where potential reputation eﬀect is absent, rather than estimated
from the repeated games.
Second, the model providesa unifying theory of ”special types” across diﬀerent
games. Both types of special-type players– trustworthy borrowers and ﬁghting
lenders– act like Stackelberg players: They choose the strategy they would
commit to, if they could, in order to improve long-run payoﬀs. (This is the
essence of the models of Fudenberg and Levine (1989)) Our model derives
the two diﬀerent types endogenously from the game payoﬀ structures and a
single common source: Both are special types whose behavior is similar to
that of sophisticated long-run players who maximize long-run payoﬀs. Even
though the impact of teaching is quite diﬀerent between trust and entry games
(payback in trust game is mutually beneﬁcial while ﬁghting in entry game is
privately beneﬁcial), the model captures both impacts across games with no
additional parameter.
Third, although switching from SEto AQREimproves ﬁt and explains the
deviation (2b), it cannot explain learning across sequences within an exper-
imental session, and learning across sessions, which the general model can.
Cross-sequence learning can be explained by allowing subjects to learn both
from previous periods within an eight-period sequence, and from previous
eight-period sequences.
In this paper, we apply the general model to the 20 experimental sessions
published earlier on trust and entry deterrence games, and to 8 brand new
sessions. The new data provide additional replication of the basic patterns
and give us more statistical power. We estimate that more than 90% of the
long-run players in both games are sophisticated. About half of the short-
run players are estimated to be sophisticated in sessions with inexperienced
subjects, but all the short-run players are estimated to be sophisticated after
experience.
To verify that the general model captures the trends in the data and to un-
derstand the impact of each feature of the model in tracking the data, we
simulate the behavior of the model under various parameter restrictions (i.e.,
after ”disabling” features one at a time) and compare with the data.
The three empirical regularities discussed above can be translated into cross-
round trends and cross-sequence trends. We ﬁnd that the model tracks data
well in both cross-round and cross-sequence trends: when there is a signiﬁcant
trend in the data, the model picks up the trend as well.
We disable four key features of the model one at a time: cross-sequence learn-
ing, the proportion of sophisticated lenders, the home-made prior, and the
proportion of sophisticated borrowers. And we ﬁnd that disabling the features
5has signiﬁcant impact on the ability of the model to pick up the trends in the
data. In some cases, the prediction of the restriction model either does not
pick up the trend at all or predicts an opposite trend.
The next section introduces the model of repeated games and reports new
experiments that measure the proportions of special types. Section 3 discusses
the keydiﬀerences among equilibrium,AQREand the proposed model. Section
4 reports estimates of the models on three data sets from repeated trust and
entry-deterrence games. Section 5 checks the robustness of the model through
simulation. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Repeated Games
We consider any two-player repeated game with incomplete information, where
the long-run player can be one of two types (or equivalently, have one of the
two induced payoﬀ functions) and short-run player is uncertain about long-
run player’s type. In repeated borrower-lender trust relationships, a lender
is uncertain about whether a borrower is honest or dishonest. In repeated
incumbent-entry games, an entrant is uncertain whether an incumbent will
always ﬁght entry or not. We refer to the honest borrowers and aggressive
borrowers as special types. Standard equilibriumanalysis assumes both players
are sophisticated and behave according to the prediction of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Table 1 shows the various player segments in the proposed model. p fraction of
long-run playersare induced to be special type and (1−p)f r a c t i o nt ob en o r m a l
type. Of the normal type players, a fraction θ has an inherent preference for
special type’s payoﬀ function, a fraction (1 − θ) · αB are sophisticated and
af r a c t i o n( 1− θ) · αB are myopic. A αL fraction of short-run players are
sophisticated and the remaining 1 − αL are adaptive. If αL = αB =1 ,t h e
model reduces to AQRE. If αL = αB = 0, the model reduces to the self-tuning
EWA learning model.
The proposed model allows a fraction θ of long-run player’s with normal-type
payoﬀ to act like the special-type payoﬀ (this fraction is previously labeled as
homemade prior). Along with the fraction p of the borrower players who are
induced to behave like special types by the experimenter, the total fraction
who actually behave like special types is p +( 1− p)θ.
Earlier experiments imputed a value for the homemade prior (Camerer and
Weigelt (1988a), Neral and Ochs (1992)) or estimated it from a structural
model (Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988), McKelvey and Palfrey (1992)). We mea-
sured the frequency of homemade prior in two separate experimental sessions
6with one-shot games with random rematching (using the same subject pools
used in the early trust experiments). In these games, there is no reputational
incentive for behaving like special type players. The measured rate of those
behaviors is then used to constrain their frequency in the repeated game esti-
mation.
In a typical experimental session, subjects are randomly assigned ﬁxed roles
of borrower, or lender (e.g., 11 subjects are divided into 3 borrowers and 8
lenders). In a single sequence, a borrower B is randomly chosen to play in all
the periods of an eight-period supergame (the other borrowers sit and watch).
In addition, the borrower may be payoﬀ-induced to be an honest type with
probability p where p is set by the experimenter a priori. A borrower type
remains the same for all 8 periods of the sequence. Each lender Li plays in
exactly one of the 8 stage games in each supergame in a random position each
time (the position of a particular lender-subject in each sequence is unknown
to the borrower). The entire eight-stage supergame is repeated in a series of
sequences (typically 50 to 100 sequences).
We model the choice probabilities of each segment f (f assumes a value of
a for adaptive learner and a value of s for sophisticated player) of players at
time t. In specifying the probability, we adopt the logistic approach in which
lenders of segment f attach an attraction value A
j
L(f,k,t) to each strategy
j in a given round t of a sequence k. Similarly, borrowers of segment f  (f 
assumes a value of m for myopic player, a value of s for sophisticated player,
and a value of h if the borrower behaves like an honest type) have an attraction
value A
j
B(f ,k,t) to each strategy j in a given round t of a sequence k.B e l o w ,




B(f ,k,t)(i = L,B) are determined for
each segment of the players in Table 1.
2.1 Adaptive Lenders
Recall that lenders play only once in each sequence. Yet they clearly respond
to the experiences of the other players, which they only observe. So we assume
“observational learning”: Players can learn from previous rounds in a sequence
and from previous sequences. Consider round 7 in sequence 14. The round 7
lender who is deciding what to do saw what happened in the previous 6 rounds
of sequence 14, and learned about the attractiveness of lending from what
happened in those rounds. But the lender also knows what happened in the
upcoming (7th) round of the previous sequences 1-13 –a glance at the past–
and learned about whether she should loan in round 7 from those previous
round 7 experiences. We call the latter eﬀect cross-sequence learning.
Within-sequence learning can be modeled by standard learning theories. We
7use a “self-tuning” EWA model of Ho, Camerer, and Chong (2004) for its
parsimony (with only 1 parameter) and versatility(it has predicted reasonably
accurately in other games). (Other adaptive models could be used in its place
as well).
Returning to our example, the strategy loan for a lender before period 7 of
sequence 14 is inﬂuenced by two sources of experience –the attraction of loan
after period 6 of sequence 14, and the experience after choosing loan in period
7 of sequences 1-13. These inﬂuences are captured by diﬀerentially updating
the attractions of the strategies.
The strength of cross-sequence learning is parameterized by a parameter τ.I f
τ = 0 there is no cross-sequence learning; if τ = 1 experience in upcoming
periods of previous sequences is just as important as experience in the previous
period of the current sequence. The data will tell us how strong cross-sequence
learning is through the value of τ.
The updating of the attraction for an adaptive lender A
j
L(a,k,t) occurs in 2
steps. The idea is to create an “interim” attraction for round t, B
j
L(a,k,t),
based on the attraction A
j
L(a,k,t − 1) and payoﬀ from the round t,t h e n
incorporate experience in round t + 1 from previous sequences, transforming
B
j
L(a,k,t) into a ﬁnal attraction A
j
L(a,k,t). The exact speciﬁcation of the
attraction updating is as follows:









[δj(k,t)+[ 1− δj(k,t)] · I(j,sL(k,t))]πL(j,sB(k,t))
M(k,t)
(1)
M(k,t)=φ(k,t) · N(k,t− 1) + 1 (2)
where φ(k,t)a n dδ(k,t) are functional parameters and N(k,0) = 1, as
speciﬁed in Ho et al. (2004) (see Appendix for further details). 5 The ini-
tial attraction A
j
L(a,k,0) = A0(No Loan/Not Enter) for the strategy j =
No Loan (Not Enter) is estimated. I(j,sL(k,t)) is the indicator function
5 In Camerer et al. (2002), adaptive short run players follows a parametric EWA
model with a ﬁxed set of parameter estimates. Having a ﬁxed set of learning pa-
rameters restricts model ﬂexibility. It seem reasonable to assume that the adaptive
player relies less on her past learning experience when she senses that her past ex-
perience does not help (lending no longer seems that attractive when more defaults
are happening). The reliability of past experience does deteriorate in later rounds
when default happens more often. Having ﬁxed parameters hinders this learning
ﬂexibility.
8that equals 1 if strategy j is the chosen strategy sL(k,t) of lender L in
round t of sequence k, and equals 0 otherwise.




φ(k,t)τ · M(k,t) · B
j






τ · M(k,t)+τ (4)
where we assume that the learning about an upcoming round t from
previous sequences is driven by the average payoﬀ in the round t’s in all





The attraction at the end of time period t then determines the predicted















The sophisticated lender rationally anticipates the action of the borrower and
maximizesher own expectedpayoﬀ in eachperiod. Let the lender’sbeliefabout
the overall fraction of honest types at sequence k and end of time t be r(k,t).
Then, the remaining fraction (1 − r(k,t)) of borrowers are either myopic or
sophisticated. Their combined predicted probability of choosing strategy j  at
t + 1 is as follows: ˆ P
j 
B(d,k,t+1 )=[ ( 1− αB) · ˆ P
j 
B (m)+αB · ˆ P
j 
B (s,k,t +1 ) ] .







(1 − r(k,t)) ˆ P
j 





 )( 6 )
where πL(j,j ) is the lender’s payoﬀ for strategy j when borrower chooses j .
ˆ P
j 
B (h) is the probability that an honest borrower chooses strategy j . 6
If the sophisticated lender chooses loan, she updates her belief in a Bayesian
manner at the end of t+1 using the borrower’s choice probabilities as follows:
6 Notice that ˆ P
j 
B (h) does not depend on arguments k and t because the probability







B (h) · r(k,t)+ ˆ P
j 
B(d,k,t+1 )· (1 − r(k,t))
(7)
where j  is the chosen strategy.
If the lender chooses noloan,t h e nr(k,t +1 )=r(k,t). Each lender starts at
round 1 with the prior P(Honest), or r(k,1) = p +( 1− p)θ.
Updating the belief r(k,t) changes the attractions A
j
L(s,k,t) and captures
learning. The updated attraction determines the sophisticated lender’s choice















Honest borrowers always earn more from repaying (by deﬁnition). They choose
according to the stage game payoﬀs of honest type conditional on loan by the










Since borrowers move after the lenders do, there is nothing for a borrower to
learn. We call the borrowers who care only about immediate payoﬀ “myopic”.
The attractions of repay and default are simply the stage-game payoﬀs of
dishonest type conditional on loan by the lender. They choose between those










The sophisticated borrower maximizes the total expected payoﬀ from all re-
maining periods. The payoﬀ from choosing strategy j in round t of sequence




 )+VB(k,t+1 |r(k,t+ 1)) (11)
where VB(k,t +1 |r(k,t + 1)) refers to the ex ante value of the borrower for
all remaining rounds after t+1 of the game given the lender’s posterior belief
r(k,t +1 )a tt i m et +1 .N o t et h a tr(k,t + 1) above is determined by r(k,t)
and the probability of strategy j using equation 7.



















L)+VB(k,t+1 |r(k,t+ 1))]); (12)
where Jt is the sequence of future actions by the sophisticated borrower from
round t+ 1 until the end of the game sequence, 7 Jt ≡{ jt,j t+1,...,j T−1,j T}.
The lender’s probability given a future path Jt is given by ¯ P
j 
L (d,k,t |Jt)=
[(1 − αL) · ¯ P
j 
L (a,k,t|Jt)+αL · ¯ P
j 
L (s,k,t|Jt)] where αL is the proportion of
sophisticated lender.
This future payoﬀ term in 12 gives an incentive for the sophisticated bor-
rower to inﬂuence the lender. That is, even if πB(repay,j )i sl o w e rt h a n
πB(default,j ), the attraction A
repay
B (s,k,t|r(k,t)) may be higher because of
the consequences of choosing Repay for VB(k,t +1 |r(k,t + 1)). The idea is
to make the lender want to lend in future rounds. This is accomplished by
repaying in earlier rounds (with a view to teach the lenders), so that the so-
phisticated lender revises upward her prior on the borrower (through equation
7; cf Kalai and Lehrer (1993)) and the adaptive lender improves the attraction
of the lending strategy (through equation 1).
7 Technically, computing the teaching borrower attractions requires evaluating all
the paths Jt to ﬁnd the maximum. This is computationally cumbersome in early
periods (e.g., in period 8 there are 28 = 64 paths). To simplify computation, we
maximize only over paths of future borrower actions that never have repayment
following default, because repayments following default are rare and usually yield
lower payoﬀs. (This reduces the number of paths to only nine – always repaying,
plus repayment followed by defaulting in period t then always defaulting, for each
t from 1 to 8.)
11The ﬁnal attraction then determines the lender’s choice probability according














2.6 Likelihood and Estimation
The models are estimated using 3 datasets: two trust game datasets from
Camerer and Weigelt (1988a,b) and one entry deterrence dataset from Jung
et al. (1994). All experimental sessions within a dataset are restricted to have a
common set of parameters (exceptfor the scale sensitivityparameters λsw h e r e
each session has its own). Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) was used
to calibrate the model on 70% of the sequences in each experimental session,
then forecast behavior in the remaining 30% of the sequences in that session.
If the model ﬁts in-sample purely by overﬁtting, it will perform surprisingly
poorly out-of-sample.
The likelihood function used in estimation consists of three parts:
(1) The likelihood of observing the data of the lenders is as follows:
LL =[ ( 1− αL) · ΠkΠt ˆ P
sL(k,t)
L (a,k,t)+αL · ΠkΠt ˆ P
sL(k,t)
L (s,k,t)] (14)
where sL(k,t) is the strategy actually chosen by lender L at time t in
sequence k.
(2) For the sequences where an honest-type borrower is drawn (with prob-




B =Π k”Πt ˆ P
sB(k”,t)
B (h) (15)
where k” are the sequences with honest types and sB(k”,t) is the strategy
chosen by the borrower at time t in sequence k”
(3) For the sequences where an dishonest-type is drawn, the likelihood of
observing the data of the borrowers is as follows:
L
D
B =θ · Πk Πt ˆ P
sB(k ,t)
B (h)+( 1− θ) ·
 
(1 − αB) · Πk Πt ˆ P
sB(k ,t)
B (m)






where k  are the sequences with dishonest-type draws and sB(k ,t)i st h e
strategy chosen by the borrower at time t in sequence k .
12Finally, the total likelihood of observing all the data is given by LL · LH
B · LD
B.
2.7 Measuring the Homemade Prior θ Experimentally
Earlier trust and entry experiments showed that even when the induced frac-
tion of honest borrowers or ﬁghter types is zero, there is a substantial re-
payment and ﬁghting in ﬁnite games (even in the last period). Inspired by
the “gang of four” model of Kreps and Wilson (1982), Camerer and Weigelt
(1988a) suggested this was due to the presence of an endogenous fraction of
subjects who, despite monetary incentives to default, simply preferred to act
reciprocally and repay– a “homemade prior” of reciprocal types. Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1988) used the same idea to explain contribution in public goods
games. 8
In Camerer et al. (2002), the homemade prior θ is estimated from the data as
part of ﬁtting a QREmodel. The resulting estimates were high– from .5 to
1– compared to the values around .1-.2 suggested by early experiments. This
probably means the QREmodel needs to overestimate θ in order to make up
for some other basic misspeciﬁcation.
Since the homemade prior is intimately tied to the extent of repaying or ﬁght-
ing, it is important to estimate it precisely and plausibly. By deﬁnition, honest
or aggressive types will repay or ﬁght even in one-shot games (their behav-
ior springs from preferences, not strategy). Therefore, we recently measured θ
by conducting two experimental sessions of one-shot games, reproducing the
original experimental conditions 9 from repeated games as closely as possible
while generating enough data for a reliable estimate.
One session used the most common payoﬀ structure in trust games and the
other session used the most common structure in entry games (see Table 2). 10
Each session used 12 subjects playing two blocks of 6 rounds in a ﬁxed-role
protocol (as in the original experiments). In each block of six rounds, each
borrower was matched with each lender once in a “zipper” design. Each bor-
8 More recently, this intuition has been formalized in models of social preference
used to explain contribution (and punishment) in public good games, reciprocity,
rejections of ultimatum oﬀers, and so forth (e.g., Fehr and G¨ achter (2000) and
Camerer (2003, chap. 2)).
9 The original experiments were run in 1986 and 1990 respectively.
10The lender’s payoﬀ used was -50 when the borrower reneges. This payoﬀ is iden-
tical to trust data sessions 6-8 where p =0 .1 and new trust data sessions 1-7 where
p =0 .1. The entrant’s payoﬀ used was 80 when the weak monopolist ﬁghts in
market-entry games. This corresponds to market entry game sessions 1-3 (inexpe-
rienced) and 6 (experienced) where p =1 /3.
13rower therefore plays the same lender twice, but never knows which lender she
is playing. A total of 72 single-shot games were played in each experimental
session.
Since the crucial behavior is repayment by borrowers, we used the “strategy
method” in which borrowers chose whether to repay or default before knowing
whether they received a loan. (Otherwise, repayment decisions are only ob-
served when lenders lend, which severely limits the number of such decisions.)
Dollar payments were those used in the original experiments, adjusted upward
for inﬂation. 11 In trust games there were 17 repayments (26%) and in entry
games there were 11 ﬁght choices out of 72 (18%). These percentages are close
to the 17% ﬁgure originally imputed by Camerer and Weigelt (1988a).
Because these samples are modest in size, θ may not be estimated too precisely.
Therefore, the estimationbelow restrictsθ, as estimatedin the repeated games,
to lie in a 95% conﬁdence interval of the values measured in the one-shot
experiments. These intervals are (.19,.29) for trust and (.11,.20) for entry.
3S p e c i a l C a s e s
To provide a context on which the empirical results can be discussed, we ﬁrst
contrast several key characteristics of the SEAQRE , adaptive learning, and
the general models.
The delicate logic of the repeated-game equilibrium can be illustrated with
the trust game. Table 2 shows payoﬀs in the Camerer-Weigelt repeated trust
game. Recall that a single borrower is drawn to play an 8-period sequence.
Her type (either honest or dishonest) is drawn randomly using a commonly-
known prior and communicated only to the borrower herself. The borrower
then plays a sequence of stage games with eight lenders who play once each
in random order.
In each stage game, the lender can choose not to lend (then both earn 10
currency units) or can choose to lend. Lenders prefer to lend if the borrower
will repay, yielding 40 for the lender. But if the borrower defaults the lender
earns -100. 12 A dishonest borrower earns 60 if she repays, and 150 if she
defaults. Honest-type borrowers have the same payoﬀs except a default pays
0. Note that in the subgame after receiving a loan, the myopic dishonest
borrower prefers to default while the honest borrower prefers to repay. The
11The original experiments were in 1986 and 1990, so we adjusted payments by the
GDP deﬂator, increasing them by 50% and 23% respectively.
12In sessions 4-6, the lender’s default payoﬀ was -50. In sessions 7-8, it was -75.
14probability that an borrower had honest-type payoﬀs in a particular sequence
was varied across experimental sessions from 0.33 to 0.
The SEis computed from the last period backward (see Camerer et al. (2002)
for details). In the last period, risk-neutral lenders lend if their perceived
P(Honest) is above a threshold γ = .79. Anticipating this, normal borrowers
mix in period 7 by repaying with enough probability to make the lender’s
updated P(Honest)=.79 in period 8, which makes lenders indiﬀerent. Guessing
accurately how borrowers will mix the lender’sP(Honest) threshold in period 7
is γ2. The same argument works by induction back to period 1. In each period
the lender has a threshold of perceived P(Honest) which makes her indiﬀerent
between lending and not lending. The path of these threshold P(Honest) values
is simply γ9−n in period n. When the updated P(Honest) in period t is above
the threshold in the period t+1, the lender always lend and normal borrowers
always repay in period t. After that phase, lenders mix and borrowers default
with increasing probability if they get a loan.
Besides this sharp restriction on equilibrium lending and default, Bayesian
updating and optimization impose two more very strong restrictions: Since
only normal borrowers default, after a default the borrower’s type is revealed
and players should neither lend nor repay after that. And after a later period
in which there is no loan, the borrower misses an opportunity to improve her
reputation, so players should neither lend nor repay after that period.
Jung et al. (1994) ran a ‘chain-store’ entry deterrence game with payoﬀs as
shown in Table 2. With these parameters, the sequential equilibrium is very
much like the one in the trust game: Fighting for a couple of periods (and
entrants wisely staying out) followed by mixing, with an increasing tendency
to share toward later periods.
The SEpredicts that many events have zero probability (e.g., lending after a
default). But these events are actually observed occasionally, so the likelihood
function blows up unless some notion of error or trembling is added to the
model. AQRE(McKelvey and Palfrey (1998)) adds trembling toward better-
responses (noisily best-respond), and assumes that the agents understand the
likely trembling that other players are doing. A homemade prior θ is also
included into the AQREmodel (because this proved useful in ﬁtting data in
the earlier analyses).
The AQREmodel is implemented with four parameters– three diﬀerent re-
sponse sensitivities (λ’s) for sophisticated lenders, honest borrowers, and so-
phisticated borrowers (since there are no adaptive lenders and myopic borrow-
ers), and a perceived prior belief of lenders about P(honest) or P(aggressive)
(restricted to be within the conﬁdence interval determined by the new one-
shot game data mentioned above). AQREis a plausible benchmark and ﬁts
15many other data sets well (e.g., McKelveyand Palfrey (1998), Goeree and Holt
(1999), Ho et al. (1998)). However, it is noteworthy that even in the agent-
based form, AQREestimation in these data is much more computationally
challenging than in any previous applications to extensive-form games, which
have all used much simpler games with fewer nodes (see Camerer et al. (2002)
for details). 13
The general model relaxesthe keyAQREassumptions that all playersBayesian-
update belief and predict accurately the likely actions of others. The model
allows for the existence of the strategically un-sophisticated players (those
who learn adaptively or respond myopically). If αL = αB = 1, the general
model reduces to AQRE.
The general model also nests a self-tuning version of the experience-weighted
attraction model that has been used to ﬁt and predict a wide range of ex-
perimental data (Camerer and Ho (1999), Ho et al. (2004)). If αL = αB =0 ,
all lenders are adaptive and borrowers are either honest or myopic. We do
not report results of this special case because all three datasets use a ﬁxed
matching protocol for the long-run player and the parameters αL and αB are
generally greater than 0.5, indicating the existence of a signiﬁcant portion of
sophisticated players.
4D a t a a n d R e s u l t s
This paper ﬁts the general and AQREmodels to experimental data from
three sources. The ﬁrst is eight experimental sessions of a repeated borrower-
lender trust game reported by Camerer and Weigelt (1988a). The second is
a previously unpublished sample of eight more sessions of the same game
(with prior P(honest), p = .10) in which players also report beliefs about
whether the borrower will default if there is a loan (Camerer and Weigelt
(1988b)). 14 These data are called “new trust” games. The third is 12 sessions
of an entry-deterrence game from Jung et al. (1994). Eight of the sessions
use inexperienced subjects (participating in that particular game for the ﬁrst
time) and four use experienced subjects who returned for a second session
13QRE is computationallynightmarish with 64 strategiesbecause solving it requires
solving a system of 64 simultaneous equations with Bayesian updating between
nodes. Rather than using a distribution over all 28 = 64 supergame strategies, play-
ers choose a distribution of strategies at each node (as if each node is controlled by a
separate “agent”); hence the modiﬁed AQRE. The model can then be approximated
by computing beliefs and expected payoﬀs at each node using backward induction,
which is a convenient shortcut.
14See Camerer and Weigelt (2005) for discussion of the beliefs.
16playing the same game. There are a total of 28 experimental sessions, roughly
2,000 8-period sequences and 26,000 choices. 15
4.1 Trust games
Typical patterns in the old trust data can be seen in Figures 1a-b (pooling
across all sessions to reduce sampling error). Periods 1,...,8 denote periods in
each sequence. The ﬁgures show relative frequencies of not lending (all data)
and default (conditional on lending, for dishonest borrowers only), assuming
there was no default earlier in the sequence. Sequences are combined into ten-
sequence blocks (denoted “sequence” in the ﬁgures) and average frequencies
are reported from those blocks.
Two patterns in the data are of primary interest. First, what is the rate of
lending across periods (and how does it change across sequences)? Second,
how do borrowers respond to loans in diﬀerent periods (and how do these
responses vary across sequences)? Figure 1a-b show that lenders start by gen-
erally making loans (i.e., low frequency of no-loan) in early periods, then learn
to rarely lend (i.e., high frequency of no-loan) in periods 7-8. Borrowers rarely
default in early periods, but frequently default in periods 7-8. The pattern of
increasing default in later periods is particularly dramatic in later sequences
so there is cross-sequence learning. Figures 2a-b show frequencies for the eight
new trust sessions. The general pattern of results is similar to that in Figure
1 although NoLoanand Default choices are more common in earlier periods.
How well the models capture these patterns can be judged in two ways: 1) over-
all statistics measuring ﬁt (log likelihood); and 2) reported parameter values.
Table 3 summarizes log likelihoods (LL) for in-sample calibration and out-of-
sample validation. The general model performs signiﬁcantly better in-sample
and out-of-sample than the AQREin both old (1988a)and new (1988b)trust
data. The fact that the per-period log likelihoods are similar in calibration and
validation suggests that the general model does not overﬁt (if it did, valida-
tion would have a larger negative log likelihood). The general model seems to
improve a little on AQREby allowing a sizeable fraction of adaptive learners,
15Subjects in the trust games were either MBA students at NYU (in the original
data) or undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania (in the new trust data).
They were paid an average of $18 for a 2-1/2 hour session. Instructions are avail-
able in Camerer and Weigelt (1988a). Subjects in the entry-deterrence games were
University of Pittsburgh undergraduates. See Jung et al. (1994) for design details.
Each session had 48-101 eight-period sequences. In each trust session, there were 11
subjects, three borrowers and eight lenders. In each entry-deterrence session, there
were 7 subjects, three monopolists and four entrants.
17which AQREdoes not. 16
Table 4 gives estimated parameter values. 17 The estimated percentages of
sophisticated lenders αL are 43% and 63%, respectively, for old and new trust
data. The corresponding percentages of sophisticated borrowers are 100% and
95% for old and new trust data, suggesting that virtually all the long-run
borrowers are teaching.
4.2 Entry-deterrence games
Now we turn to the Jung et al. data on entry-deterrence. Since they ran
experiments both with inexperienced subjects and experienced subjects, we
can see whether subjects grow more sophisticated when they repeat an entire
experimental session.
Equilibrium predicts rates of entry and sharing to start low and rise as the
end of a sequence draws near. Actual entry and sharing by inexperienced
subjects are far too frequent in early periods but there is some convergence
toward early entry-deterrence across the experimental session (see Figures 3a-
b). Inexperienced entrants just didn’t quite ﬁgure out how much it pays to
ﬁght entry in early periods.
Figures 4a-b show data from experienced subjects. The correspondence of
behavior to equilibrium is much more dramatic. In the ﬁrst sequence block,
players often enter in the ﬁrst 3 periods, but they quickly learn early entry is
rarely met with sharing, and they stay out in early periods of later sequences.
16Note also that the model is almost as accurate when all sessions are pooled,
with common parameters, as when ﬁt statistics from session-speciﬁc estimation are
totaled up, although 40 fewer parameters are estimated when data are pooled. (See
our 2004 working paper for details of session-by-session estimation). This is a big
hint that the parameter estimates are quite stable across sessions for the teaching
model. Our earlier working paper reports two other comparisons. Allowing φ,δ, and
κ to be free parameters (common within each data set) and estimating them, rather
than deriving them from functions as self-tuning EWA does, improves out-of-sample
accuracy slightly in hit rate and likelihood in most data sets. Fixing the homemade
prior θ to zero hurts the likelihood substantially in two data sets and gives hit rates
less than chance (below 50%) except in the inexperienced entry game data.
17Keep in mind that in self-tuning EWA φ,δ and κ are not estimated, they are func-
tions of the data. The averaged functional values of φ,δ and κ are quite consistent
across sessions. They are also in the ballpark of the values estimated in parametric
EWA (see Ho et al. (2004)), except that the functional φ is always too high (.76-.77
compared to unconstrained estimates of .45 and .25). The fact that pooling across
sessions degrades overall ﬁt only a little, and parameters are consistent across the
new and old trust data sets, is encouraging. See our working paper for details.
18Summary statistics in Table 3 shows that the general teaching and AQRE
models are about equally accurate for experienced subjects. With 100% of
the borrowers and lenders sophisticated (αL = αB = 1), the general model
reduces to AQRE. For inexperienced subjects, the general model is much more
accurate than AQRE, reﬂecting the presence of adaptive lenders.
Table 4 shows estimated parameter values. The estimated fractions of sophis-
ticated players are smaller for inexperienced subjects (αL = .67, αB = .91)
than for experienced subjects (αL = αB = 1). This increase in sophistication
is also observed by Stahl (1999) in matrix games, Camerer et al. (2002) in a
dominance-solvable (p-beauty contest) game, and Cooper and Kagel (2001) in
signaling games. This seems to be a robust ﬁnding, and a sensible one– players
come to realize how others are learning after they play the same game in two
consecutive sessions.
A challenging test for both the general and AQREmodels is whether sim-
ilar parameter values can be used to explain behavior in trust games and
entry-deterrence games. These games are opposite in incentive structure in the
sense that special type behavior (repaying or ﬁghting) is mutually-beneﬁcial
in trust games but only privately-beneﬁcial in entry-deterrence. If the same
general model structure and parameters can explain both games that shows
some robustness which encourages broader application. In fact, the trust and
inexperienced entry data give similar values of self-tuning EWA parameters of
φ (.76-.78) and δ (.15-.19). This is an encouraging ﬁrst step towards a general
learning-based theory of diﬀerent repeated games.
Many results are consistent across both games. The AQREmodel predicts
rather well, but it is helped substantially by allowing the constrained home-
made prior above zero. Restricting θ = 0 degrades ﬁt of AQREa lot. In terms
of overall out-of-sample ﬁt, the general model is always a little better than
AQRE. The key diﬀerence between the two models is that some lenders and
entrants learn in the general model but they always anticipate what borrowers
and incumbents will do in AQRE. The fact that the general model generally
ﬁts and predicts better than AQREmeans that weakening sophistication of
‘short-run’ players has some is empirical value. However, the two models are
equivalent with experienced entry-game subjects, which shows the power of
experimental experience to create full sophistication.
5 Model Robustness
We subject the general model to a stress test by checking the robustness of the
model using simulation (c.f. Cooper, Garvin, and Kagel (1997)). The idea of
this robustness check is: 1) to verify if the general model is able to reproduce
19the empirical trends exhibited by the data and 2) to assess the impact of the
features of the model in tracking data.
Four trends in the data emerge from the visual inspection of the ﬁgures 1-
4. There are two cross-round trends: 1. the frequency of NoLoan or Entry
increases across rounds; and 2. the frequency of Default or Share increases
across rounds. The other two are cross-sequence trends: 3. the frequency of
NoLoan or Entry decreases across sequence in early rounds but increases
across sequence in later rounds; and 4. the frequency of Default or Share de-
creases across sequences in early rounds but increases across sequences in later
rounds. We check for the statistical signiﬁcance of these visual observations.
To conﬁrm the signiﬁcance of cross-round trends in the data, we run the
following regressions on each of the four datasets across round t:
Probkt (No Loan/Entry) = aLt + bLt · t, (17)
Probkt (Default/Sharing Given Loan/Entry) = aBt+ bBt· t, (18)
where t indexes round and k indexes the sequence blocks in Figures 1-4. Both
bLt and bBt are signiﬁcantly positive, conﬁrming our visual observation of
trends 1 and 2.
To checkthesigniﬁcance of cross-sequence trends in the data, we partition each
dataset into the ﬁrst 4 rounds and last 4 rounds and run separate regressions
for each partition across sequences k:
Probkt (No Loan/Entry) = aLkR + bLkR · k, (19)
Probkt (Default/Sharing Given Loan/Entry) = aBkR + bBkR · k (20)
where R = 1 represent the ﬁrst 4 rounds and R = 2 represent the last 4
rounds.
We expect bLk1 < 0a n dbLk2 > 0 for a signiﬁcant trend 3 and bBk1 < 0a n d
bBk2 > 0 for a signiﬁcant trend 4. We are only able to ﬁnd partial conﬁr-
mation of the cross-sequence trends. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd strong evidence of
cross-sequence trend in lender’s behavior for both the Trust data and the inex-
perienced entry data in the ﬁrst 4 rounds of the game (bLk1 < 0). We also ﬁnd
strong evidence of cross sequence trend in incumbent’s behavior in the ﬁrst 4
rounds of the game (bBk1 < 0). But the second-half cross-sequence coeﬃcients
bLk2 and bBk2 are not signiﬁcant.
Next, we investigate if these signiﬁcant trends in the data are replicated by
the model prediction. We ﬁrst generate the prediction of the general model
by simulating choices using the parameter estimates of the general model
from Table 4. For each 8-round sequence, we produce 1000 simulated choice
20paths of both lenders (or entrants) and borrowers (or incumbents). The 1000
simulated paths are averaged to produce the simulated probabilities for each
sequence. These simulated probabilities are subjected to the same signiﬁcance
tests across periods and sequences we run for the data; slope coeﬃcients for
cross-round and cross-sequence trends for data and the simulated model are
reported below the ﬁgures. The results for the Trust data and the inexperi-
enced entry data are presented in Figures 5 and 6. 18 Judging from the plots
and the signiﬁcant estimates, the general model is able to reproduce the sig-
niﬁcant trends in the data fairly accurately (although the estimated b. trend
coeﬃcients are a little smaller in magnitude).
Is each key feature of the model necessary to capture the trends? We ﬁnd
out by “disabling” each feature individually and simulating choice using the
restricted models with each feature disabled separately. There are four key
features of the model: cross-sequence learning, the proportion of sophisticated
lenders, the home-made prior, and the proportion of sophisticated borrowers.
The ﬁrst two are parameters driving the lender’s choices and the last two
are driving the borrower’s choices. The details of the simulation and the trend
signiﬁcance regression analysis are the same as before. The plots and regression
results are reported in Figures 7 and 8. The ﬁgures combine all sequences so
several parameter conﬁgurations can be put on a single 3-D graph. The general
ﬁndings benchmarked against data are:
(1) disabling cross-sequence learning results in less Loan initially and more
Loan in later rounds (the cross-round trend has a lower slope bLt and
higher intercept aLt than the general model). There is obviously more
learning in the data than within-sequence learning. We also see more
default in later rounds in response to this lender behavior (I.e., the slope
bBt when τ = 0 is lower than in the general model). In entry game, there
is more entry and less sharing in later rounds (i.e., the slope bBt when
τ = 0 is lower than the general model).
(2) disabling sophisticated lenders (αL = 0) results in a ﬂatter rise in NoLoan
frequency across rounds (i.e., bLt with αL = 0 is lower than the general
model) and a steep drop in entry rate across rounds (which is going
against data trend). The restricted model predicts a lower default and
more sharing pattern than the data. This shows that allowing no sophis-
ticated lenders harms ﬁt.
(3) disabling the sophisticated borrowers (αB = 0) results in a ﬂat default
and sharing rate. This suggests that there are non-myopic borrowers. It
18In addition, the signiﬁcant cross-round eﬀects for Camerer and Weigelt (1988b)
are bLt =0 .08,b Bt =0 .06 for data and bLt =0 .05,b Bt =0 .04 for the model. The
signiﬁcant cross-round eﬀects for the experienced subjects in Jung et al. (1994) are
bLt =0 .09,b Bt =0 .11 for data and bLt =0 .07,b Bt =0 .07 for the model. All are
signiﬁcant at 5%.
21predicts a ﬂatter rise in no loan across rounds than the data (bLt is too
low).
(4) disabling the home-made prior (θ = 0) results in substantially overpre-
diction of default and sharing rate (They are higher than both the data
and the general model prediction in every round, i.e. aBt is higher.). This
provide strong evidence of the Special home-made type. It results in a
ﬂatter rise in no loan rate (bLt is lower) and an almost ﬂat entry rate.
In general, disabling each of these four features, one at a time, shows that
each of the features contribute to the ability of the general model to describe
subjects’ behavior. The simulations also indicate that each feature indeed
captures the right part of the behavior that feature is meant to capture.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Many empirical learning models implicitly assume that players do not realize
others are learning. This paper adds “sophisticated” players who do realize
others are learning, in repeated games with incomplete information. Sophisti-
cated players who know they are playing a repeated game have an incentive
to take actions which are costly in the short-run, but which “teach” learners
what to expect, in a way that beneﬁts the teachers. Including teaching eﬀects
extends learning models to the many domains in which economic relationships
are long-lasting.
This paper applies a precise model of sophisticated teaching to ﬁnitely-repeated
experimental games of trust and entry-deterrence, with incomplete informa-
tion about players types (some are induced to be honest or to ﬁght entry). Ear-
lier experiments have shown that some features of behavior in these games are
approximated by very complex and delicate equilibria (Camerer and Weigelt
(1988a), Jung et al. (1994)). But it is unlikely that players approximate the
equilibria by introspection, and their comparative static predictions are often
wrong (Neral and Ochs (1992)). A boundedly rational model of learning is one
answer to the question of how people can approximate hyperrational Bayesian
equilibria.
By including several learning types, the model both adds sophistication to
adaptive learning, and adds learning to an AQREmodel. Lenders and en-
trants either learn adaptively (using a self-tuning functional EWA rule) or
sophisticatedly anticipate what borrowers and incumbents will do. Borrowers
and incumbentsare either myopic, always behave in a special way (trustworthy
or ﬁghting entry), or teach strategically.
A key diﬀerence between the proposed model and equilibrium is that the play-
22ers build reputations in AQRE(“this guys seems honest”), but the learners’
strategies have reputations (“entry is dangerous”) in the proposed model. The
proposed model is also a partial equilibrium one, because some adaptive play-
ers do not fully anticipate what others will do.
The general model was ﬁt to 28 sessions of data from both repeated trust and
entry games. Both models reproduce most of the basic trends in the data, par-
ticularly increasing default and market-sharing in later periods of a sequence,
and some cross-sequence learning. The key parameter in the general model is
the fraction of strategic teachers, αB. This ﬁgure is reliably estimated to be
about .91 for inexperienced entry-game subjects and close to 1 for trust games
and experienced entry-game data. The fact that αB rises with subject expe-
rience corroborates other ﬁndings. The AQREmodel generally ﬁts reliably
worse than the general model, which is an indication that adding a learning
component to equilibrium models helps explain how people behave.
A key point is that the same model can account for quite diﬀerent behavior
in these games: Borrowers in trust games behave in an honest way that is
mutually-beneﬁcial, while aggressive incumbents beneﬁt only themselves. The
same model explains both because the two behaviors emerge endogenously
from the same kind of interaction between teaching and payoﬀs.
Finally, we subject the general model to a stress test to check the model
robustness. Relying only on parameter estimates, the general model is able
to simulate behaviors that match the signiﬁcant trends found in the data.
Furthermore, we show that this descriptive ability degrades signiﬁcantly when
any of the four key features of the model is turned oﬀ.
In future research, it would be useful to endogenize some of the parameters
of most interest (particularly the rate of sophistication αB). The model could
also be applied to games and markets where the interaction of sophistication
and adaptive learning is interesting (e.g. inﬂation-setting, see Sargent (1999);
and price bubbles, see Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), Camerer and
Weigelt (1990) and Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001)).
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7 Appendix: Self-tuning EWA Model Speciﬁcation
Ho et al. (2004) developed a Self-tuning EWA model in which the ﬁxed pa-
rameters φ and δ are replaced by functions of data which self-adjust across
games and over time. These functions determine parameter values for each
player, each round and each sequence, which are then plugged into the EWA
updating equation to determine attractions.
The function φ(k,t) is designed to detect change in the learning environment.
25It takes the diﬀerences in corresponding elements of two frequency vectors,



















where W is the minimal number of equilibrium strategies. s
j
B denotes the j-th





W is the j-th element of a
vector that simply counts how often strategy j was played by the borrower in






is the relative frequency count of the j-th strategy over all t periods.
The parameter δ is the weight on foregone payoﬀs. Presumably this is tied to
the attention subjects pay to alternative payoﬀs, ex-post. Subjects who have
limited attention are likely to focus on strategies that would have given higher
payoﬀs than what was actually received, because these strategies present







L,s B(k,t)) >π L(k,t),
0o t h e r w i s e .
where πL(k,t)is the actual payoﬀ lenderreceivedin round t of sequence k. Sub-
jects reinforce chosen strategies (where the top inequality necessarily binds)
and all unchosen strategies with better payoﬀs (where the inequality is strict)
with a weight of one. They reinforce unchosen strategies with equal or worse
payoﬀs by zero.
26Short-Run Player 
(e.g., Lenders, Entrants) 
Proportion Specification  of 
Behavior 
Long-Run Player 
(e.g., Borrowers, Incumbents) 
Proportion Specification of 
Behavior 
Adaptive  1-αL  Section 2.1  Special (Induced) (e.g., 
Honest. Aggressive) 
p Section  2.3 
Sophisticated  αL  Section 2.2       
      Normal (Induced)  
(Dishonest, Non-aggressive) 
1-p  
         Special (Home-made)    θ  Section 2.3 
         Normal   1− θ   
               Myopic  1-αΒ  Section 2.4 
               Sophisticated  αΒ  Section 2.5 
 
Table 1: A Model of Repeated Games with both Adaptive and Sophisticated Players Table 2: Payoﬀs for the Borrower-lender Trust Games and the Entry-deterrence Games
Payoﬀs in the borrower-lender trust game, Camerer and Weigelt [1988a]
lender borrower payoﬀst o p a y o ﬀs to borrower
strategy strategy lender normal (X) honest (Y)
loan default −100∗ 150 0
repay 40 60 60
no loan no choice 10 10 10
Payoﬀs in the entry-deterrence game, Jung, Kagel and Levin [1994]
entrant incumbent payoﬀst o p a y o ﬀst oi n c u m b e n t
strategy strategy entrant normal (X) ﬁghter (Y)
in ﬁght 80 70 160
share 150 160 70
out no choice 95 300 300
Note: ∗ Loan-default lender payoﬀs were -50 in sessions 6-8 and -75 in sessions 9-10.Table 3: In-sample and Out-of-sample Performance of the General Model and AQRE Model 
Dataset Camerer and Camerer and




Sample size 5757 3820 5847 2232
Log-likelihood
The General Model -2919.43 -2007.20 -2246.97 -1345.76
AQRE -3218.52 -2094.17 -2418.43 -1345.76
Log-likelihood Ratio 
2  598.18 173.93 342.91 0.00
Average Probability
The General Model 0.60 0.59 0.68 0.55
AQRE 0.57 0.58 0.66 0.55
Out-of-sample Validation
Sample size 2894 1882 2866 1072
Log-likelihood
The General Model -1425.16 -947.25 -1341.15 -553.11
AQRE -1525.69 -989.44 -1425.53 -553.11
Average Probability
The General Model 0.61 0.60 0.63 0.60
AQRE 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.60
Note 1: Calibrated on all observations for 70% of the subjects instead of 70% observations of all subjects.
Note 2: Threshold for significant χ
2 test is 12.59 at 5% for 6 degrees of freedom
Jung, Kagel and Levin (1994)Table 4: Parameter Estimates 
1 
Dataset Camerer and Camerer and




Functional  φ 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.76
Functional  δ 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.34
τ   0.94 0.68 0.35 0.12
A0 (No Loan/Not Enter) -2.09 -1.52 -1.63 0.39
λ
a
L 11.40 5.89 3.90 3.70
Sophisticated Lender
α L  0.43 0.63 0.67 1.00
λ
s




B 2.66 3.76 5.62 3.10
Sophisticated Borrower
α B  1.00 0.95 0.91 1.00
λ
s
B 5.87 8.45 2.90 1.36




B 27.32 24.76 5.70 6.30
Agent-based Quantal Response Equilibrium (AQRE)
Sophisticated Lender
α L  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
λ
s
L 6.31 5.37 4.76 6.53
Sophisticated Borrower
α B  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
λ
s
B 3.84 4.76 3.28 1.36




B 26.70 25.89 2.75 6.30
Note 1: All sessions in a dataset are pooled to produce a common set of estimates except for the scale parameters
like the λ s which are session-specific. The estimates reported here are averages. Standard errors are reported in
our working paper.
Jung, Kagel and Levin (1994)Figures 1a-b: Frequency Plots for the Trust Data from Camerer and Weigelt [1988a]





























































Figure 1b: Empirical Frequency for Default conditional 





























































Figure 2b: Empirical Frequency for Default conditional 
on Loan (Dishonest Borrower)Figures 3a-b: Frequency Plots on Inexperienced Subjects from the Entry Data from Jung, Kagel and Levin [1994]





























































Figure 3b: Empirical Frequency for Sharing conditional 





























































Figure 4b: Empirical Frequency for Sharing conditional 
on Entry (Weak Incumbent)Figures 5a-d: Cross-sequence and Cross-round Effects for the Trust Data from Camerer and Weigelt [1988a]
Cross-sequence Trends: bLk1 (data) = -0.02, bLk1 (model) = -0.01. Both are significant at 5%






























































Figure 5b: The General Model Simulated Frequency for 
Default conditional on Loan (Dishonest Borrower)Figures 6a-b: Cross-sequence and Cross-round Effects for Inexperienced Subjects from the Entry Data from Jung, Kagel and Levin [1994]
Cross-sequence Trends: bLk1 (data) = -0.02, bLk1 (model) = -0.01, bBk1 (data) = -0.03, bBk1 (model) = -0.01. All are significant at 5%






























































Figure 6b: The General Model Simulated Frequency for 
Sharing conditional on Entry (Weak Incumbent)Incumbent: bBt (data) = 0.05, bBt (model) = 0.04, bBt (ττττ =0) = 0.03, bBt (αααα L=0) = 0.03, bBt (αααα B=0) = 0.00, bBt (θθθθ =0) = 0.03 
Figures 8a-b: Parameter Restrictions for Inexperienced Subjects from the Entry Data from Jung, Kagel and Levin [1994]
Figures 7a-b: Parameter Restrictions for the Trust Data from Camerer and Weigelt [1988a]
Lender: bLt (data) = 0.10, bLt (model) = 0.05, bLt (ττττ =0) = 0.03, bLt (αααα L=0) = 0.04, bLt (αααα B=0) = 0.04, bLt (θθθθ =0) = 0.04. 






















































































































































































































































Figure 7b: Average Probability of Default Given Loan (Dishonest
Borrower)